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Abstract:  We provide an examination of the linkage between environmental regulation 
stringency and the demand for and supply of abatement goods and services. To that end we 
construct a five-equation simultaneous model that links environmental regulation stringency to 
abatement output through various underlying simultaneous mechanisms. This system is then 
estimated using a panel of 679 eco-firms in 78 industrial Chinese cities during the 
implementation period of collection and use of pollution discharge fees (promulgated by the 
Chinese State Council) from 2003 to 2007. We find that higher fees are generally associated with 
higher abatement supply but for some industries – notably wastewater treatment – there is 
evidence of ‘output restriction’, meaning that higher charges lead to a reduction in supply for 
established firms. 
JEL: J24;L60; Q56; 
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1 Introduction 
        The aim of this study is to provide a rigorous examination of the linkage between 
environmental regulation stringency and the markets for abatement goods and services, often 
called ‘eco-industries’ (David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005)). In so doing, we separate out two 
distinct mechanisms through which environmental regulation stringency may influence 
individual abatement output. The first may be labeled the direct effect and refers to the impact 
of environmental regulation stringency on an abatement supplier or eco-firm’s output. The 
second one is the indirect effect which refers to the regulation induced effect on industrial 
abatement demand and its consequent impact on the individual abatement output of eco-firms. 
We construct a five-equation simultaneous model to examine the impact of environmental 
regulation stringency on abatement output and industrial abatement volume though various 
underlying simultaneous mechanisms. This simultaneous system is then tested by the panel data 
of 679 eco-firms in 78 industrial Chinese cities during the implementation period of 
Administration on the collection and use of pollution discharge fees (promulgated by the State 
Council) from 2003 to 2007.  
        Our main contributions are as follows. First, in most of the environmental economics 
literature, as David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) indicate pollution abatement is generally 
assumed to be set only by industrial polluters, based in turn on relevant regulatory, 
technological or output market considerations, but omitting the bilateral relationship with 
actual suppliers, eco-firms. In this study, we address the environmental regulation effect on 
individual abatement output of eco-firms. Our empirical study shifts the focus from industrial 
polluters to abatement suppliers. 
        Second, we quantify the overall effect of environmental regulation stringency on individual 
abatement supply by clarifying the directions of direct effect of environmental regulation 
stringency and regulation-induced indirect effect. Our empirical results show that a stricter 
environmental policy will increases the supply of Chinese eco-firms as a whole. However, the 
quantitative impact of regulation stringency on the individual output of firms varies between 
industrial sectors, as evidenced by the difference in results between from eco-firms in the 
sewage treatment sector and those in other abatement sectors. 
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        The following section will now briefly review the literature regarding the effect of 
environmental regulation stringency on abatement supply and demand. Section 3 next presents 
our theoretical model and its explanation. Section 4 proposes the econometric specification and 
describes the dataset. Section 5 displays the empirical estimates and discusses the results. The 
final section contains concluding remarks and policy implementation. 
2 Background 
Abatement services are often produced and developed in a specific industry, a so called 
“eco-industry” which sells abatement goods, services and technologies to other polluting 
industries. When industrial polluters put effort into abating emission, they have come to largely 
rely on a growing number of eco-firms for the delivery of abatement goods, services and 
technologies as indicated by Feess and Muehlheusser (1999), Greaker and Rosendahl (2008), 
David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2011).   The development of eco-firms is determined by both the 
demand side and the supply side. Particularly, the market demand for environmentally sound 
technologies, products and services is often initialized and shaped by government promotion 
and industrial environmental performance requirements (Liu et al. 2006). We call this effect as 
the regulation-induced demand effect. As for the supply side, the environmental policy is likely 
to affect an eco-firm’s investment and output decisions and price setting. According to David et 
al. (2011) for instance, a stricter environmental policy will reduce the price-elasticity of 
abatement demand. This acts as a signal that gives an incentive to eco-firms to adjust their 
outputs and prices.  
There exists a well-developed strand of the environmental economics literature 
analyzing the strategic application of environmental regulation. The majority of this literature 
focuses on testing the Porter hypothesis and examining industrial polluters’ abatement effort as 
a response to environmental regulations, in which abatement is assumed to be set only by 
polluter. For example, Wang (2002) empirically tests the pollution abatement efforts of Chinese 
industries in response to pollution regulations and the results show that plant-level 
expenditures on end-of-pipe wastewater treatment are strongly responsive to the pollution 
charges. The estimated elasticities of operation cost and new investment with respect to 
pollution price are 65 and 27%, respectively. Backer (2005) investigate the effects of the US 
Clean Air Act on abatement capital expenditures and operating costs of manufacturing plants in 
the USA. His results show that heavy emitters of the “criteria” air pollutants that were subject to 
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more stringent regulation generally had higher abatement expenditures. Requate and Unold 
(2003) investigate incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology and show that taxes 
provide stronger incentives than permits, auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives, 
and standards may give stronger incentives than permits.  Feess and Muehlheusser (1999, 2002) 
integrated the eco-industry into the framework of strategic environmental policy, and examine 
whether tighter environmental regulation may benefit a trade nation by deriving the optimal 
environmental policy from a national point of view and show that the presence of eco-industry 
can lead to a national leadership in pollution control.   
                In the studies referred to above, the regulated eco-industry acts as a passive  
instrument for pollution control by government; none of them explicitly address the 
consequence for the eco-industry itself of stringent environmental regulation. Recently, 
economists have begun to examine the precise relationship between environmental regulations 
and the market for abatement goods and services. Greaker (2006) models the abatement sector 
as consisting of several imperfectly competitive firms. Tighter pollution regulation makes the 
sector more competitive and lowers markups. He finds conditions under which pollution 
regulation increases competitiveness between eco-firms. David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) 
consider how different policy instruments-emission tax, emission standards and voluntary 
agreements - can affect the abatement efforts by polluters and the price of abatement goods 
and services (and so affect the outputs of eco-firms).  
More recently, David et al. (2011) address the consequence of environmental regulation-
induced competition between eco-firms and indicate that environmental policy is likely to have 
impact on abatement output by influencing the entry and exit of abatement suppliers (see 
Figure 1 below which shows the demand for abatement services, A as a function of price, p and 
regulatory strictness, γ). A stricter environmental policy (increasing from 0 to 1) will cause a 
parallel upwards shift of the inverse demand function (more demand for abatement at a given 
price) which is labeled as p(γ,A) in the diagram. In addition, the inverse demand function 
becomes steeper as the environmental policy gets more stringent because demand becomes 
more inelastic. As shown in Figure 1, a stricter environmental policy generates a clockwise 
rotation of the inverse demand function. In their theoretical model, an eco-industry is assumed 
to be an oligopolistic industry with free entry. When eco-firms strategically increase their price 
through output restriction as a response to the reduced price elasticity of abatement demand, 
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the expected higher profits attract new suppliers, which may result in a “business stealing effect” 
(Mankiw and Whinston (1986)) for existing suppliers.  Note that more inelastic demand leads to 
lower output for existing firms, firm revenue increases in their model 
 
 
Figure 1. The impact of a stricter environmental policy on the abatement demand curve 
As for the impact of a stricter environmental policy on abatement demand, David et al. 
point out that the total abatement demand always goes up when the delivery of abatement 
goods and services exhibits decreasing returns to scale.  Figure 2 illustrates the aggregate 
equilibria on the abatement market when the cost of making abatement goods and services is 
convex (G’’(x)>0).  When the environmental regulation is tightened (indicated by the higher levy 
charge of pollution), the marginal revenue curve rotates towards the right due to the rotation of 
the inverse demand curve and the increase in the number of eco-firms m (m0<m1). The marginal 
cost curve, in contrast, may tilt to the right or to the left, as m increases while the individual 
marginal cost rotates to the right (since G’(A/m) decreases for any given A). In all cases, however, 
the quantity of abatement goods and services finally delivered A1 is larger than A0. 
(rotation) 
 
P 
A 
p(A,0) 
p(A,1) 
1>0 
0 
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Figure 2. The  impact of a stricter environmental policy on the  
equilibrium of the abatement market (G’’(a)>0) 
 
The basic idea is inspired by the theory in David et al. (2011) just described, but the intuitive 
argument extends to other contexts. For instance, a monopolist facing no threat of entry, will 
also face two impacts on the demand curve from an increase in regulatory strictness.  
Empirically, the problem is that there are many channels though which environmental 
regulation stringency can affect abatement. For instance, regulation stringency itself can be 
affected by fast emission growth, economic growth and so on. Therefore, we need to use a 
simultaneous equations approach to examine the impact of a more stringent environmental 
policy on both the individual output of eco-firms and industrial abatement demand. 
 
3 Model Scheme. 
Figure 3 outlines the basic structural equation model (SEM) (with causation indicated by 
arrows). In it we show the potentially complex interactions between the individual supply of 
eco-firms (x), local abatement demand (A), industrial emissions (E), local environmental 
stringency () and local economic output of goods and services (Y). It enables us to account for 
various potential correlations between environmental regulation stringency and abatement 
supply and demand through the intermediation of the other economic characteristics. The 
numbers marked besides the arrows correspond to the equation numbers in system (1) shown 
m0MR(A, 0) 
m1G’(A/m1) 
m0G’(A/m0) 
m1MR(A, 1) 
 A0  A1 
 
1>0 
A 
m1G’(A/m0) 
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later in the section. Note the identifying assumptions that the individual eco-firm’s output does 
not determine other variables;  that local environmental stringency only has an indirect effect 
on industrial output (through its effect on abatement and emissions)  and that abatement has 
no direct effect on stringency.  
 
 
 We define the following variables (where j: indicator for eco-firm, i: indicator for city, t: 
indicator for year): 
xjit: abatement output of the eco-firm 
Ait
L : local abatement demand 
Ait
O: outside abatement demand 
γit : environmental regulation stringency 
Yit: total real GDP 
Ψjit: vector of firm-level characteristics including a firm’s size, R&D expenses, advertisement 
expenses, export volume, and ownership status  
Ωit: industrial capital-labor ratio 
Kit: total capital stock employed in industrial production 
Lit: total labor employed in industrial sectors 
Eit: original industrial emission without abatement  
HCIit: industrial human capital intensity 
TECHit: technological and scientific expenses by local government 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
4 
3 
An eco-firm’s output (x) 
Local environmental 
regulation stringency (γ) 
Local abatement 
demand (A) 
Local economic 
output (Y) 
Industrial 
emission (E) 
4 3 
5 
 
Figure 3 The schema for the linkage between an eco-firm’s 
output and regulation stringency 
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E
it-1
net: lagged emission with abatement 
Heduit: city human capital level 
POPdenit: population density 
UNempit: unemployment rate 
Consequently, the relationship between the environmental regulation stringency and the 
output of an eco-firm is based on the following five- equation simultaneous system. 
 





it it it
it it it
it it it it
net
it t-1 it i
L O
jit it it it jit
L
it it i
t it it
t
it
L
it
x =f(A ,A , ,Y ) 
A ,HCI ,TECH
, ,
=a Y ,E ,
E =e(Y ) 
Y =y(K ,L ,E , )
=t(E ,Y ,Hedu ,POPden ,UNemp
A
)
                                                                                        (1) 
In the next sub-section we consider each of the equations in more detail and provide a 
justification for the identifying restrictions. 
3.1 Abatement output 
There are three sets of determinants of an eco-firm’s output in the first equation of system (1).  
outside
demand
( , , ) ( , , , )T L Ojit it it jit it it it jit
abatement local
demand demand
x x A x A A      
        The first set is the total market demand (Ait
T ) an eco-firm faces, including local abatement 
demand and demand outside the city in which it is located. The local demand can be split into 
industrial demand and public consumption. The local abatement demand mainly depends on 
industrial need for pollution abatement in contemporary China. In the large majority of urban 
and rural areas, public consumption is not a significant factor (Liu, 2006; Martens, 2006). In line 
with standard theory, we expect that a firm’s supply of a certain good is positively related to 
market demand, thus we might expect market demand for abatement to increase an eco-firm’s 
output (xA>0). As for demand outside the city (Ait
T ), since we cannot observe this demand directly, 
we use transportation volume as a proxy for the possibilities for serving other markets (trancost). 
Lower transportation volume may mean less opportunity for exports as well as fewer imports 
into the city so we have no clear prior on the sign of the impact of this variable.   
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        The second set of determinants is the pollution control policy. The direct regulatory effect 
captures the effect of stringency on an eco-firm’s output.  As indicated in section two, a strict 
environmental policy signals to the eco-firms that the polluters have become less sensitive to 
price of abatement goods and services, which directly motivates eco-firms to increase their price 
through output restriction. This attracts a larger number of abatement suppliers while possibly 
inducing each one of them to produce less at equilibria. So, tighter regulation induces a 
reduction in individual output. Hence we expect a negative coefficient for this term, which 
means xγ<0.  
The third set of determinants is the firm’s own characteristics (Ψjit), which include size, 
R&D expenses, advertisement expenses, export volume, and ownership status, etc. For some of 
these we have no clear priors, but for some, such as firm size (=employment) we expect a 
positive relationship with the supply of abatement services.   
3.2 Industrial abatement volume  
In the second equation, the demand for abatement is determined by local economic output, the 
scale of industrial emission and the regulatory environment. Emissions, Eit here are the initial 
emission generated in the industrial production process. It affects the emission volume that 
must be abated (Ait≤Eit) (and it turn may be affected by other factors, see section 3.3 below).  As 
indicated by Panayotou (1997), economic output (Yit) creates the conditions for social 
abatement by raising the demand for improved environmental quality and makes the resources 
available for supplying it. Hence, we expect that the higher the economic output, the greater the 
demand for abatement.  
        Besides Yit, Eit and γit, we also introduce industrial human capital level and R&D capacities 
into the abatement equation. As Lan and Munro (2013) indicate, environmental compliance of 
industrial polluters is significantly driven by human capital level. An industrial polluter with high 
human capital level is more likely to install abatement equipment or purchase abatement 
services. Turning to R&D capacities, abatement technologies and its transformation into 
industrial application are greatly determined by technological and scientific expenditure of the 
local government.  
Ait=a(Yit,Eit,γit, HCIit, TECHit) 
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3.3 Industrial emissions 
Grossman and Kruger (1991), distinguish between three factors that can affect emissions: scale, 
industrial composition and technique effects. Other things kept unchanged, an economy with a 
larger production scale emits more pollution, so we expect a positive coefficient for scale or Yit. 
The composition effect is often represented by the capital to labor ratio (k/l) as in Copeland and 
Taylor (1994), Antweiler et al. (2001), Cole and Elliot (2003) and Cole (2004). We expect a city to 
have a relatively less polluting industrial composition when its k/l ratio is lower. A higher 
technique leads to a pollution intensity reduction; most previous studies use environmental 
regulation stringency as proxy for this effect. In our case the technique effect is captured by γ.  
Holding other factors constant, we expect tighter environmental policy to reduce emissions.  
 
3.4 Economic output 
We suppose real output (Y) is a positive function of the stock of conventional factors of 
production, labor (L) and capital (K), and the ability to generate industrial emissions. Similar to 
most standard theories, we expect YL>0, YK>0, YE>0. In general, increased investment in 
abatement activity reduces productive investment and hampers economic growth (Barbera and 
McConnell, 1990; Gray and Shadbegian, 2003). But the presence of innovations in pollution 
abatement technology may reconcile (regulated) economic growth with the protection of the 
ecosystem (Andreoni and Levinson, 2001; Yang et al.,2012). Hence we are uncertain about the 
sign of YA. 
 
3.5 Environmental regulation stringency 
As discussed by Boyer and Laffont (1999), and the essays collected in Stavins (2004), the design 
of environmental policy is subject to pressures from public opinion and industrial lobbies. Firstly, 
if the emission is adjusted annually, the determination should include the emission level of last 
year. Second, we postulate that the regulatory stringency is also likely to be determined by local 
economic growth. There is likely to be a positive linkage between a region’s economic prosperity 
and the stringency of its regulations (Dasgupta et al., 1995, He 2006). Thus, we expect that γY>0. 
Following the reasoning of Cole et al. (2008) and Lan et al. (2012), everything else equal, we 
expect a region with a high unemployment rate will tend to have relatively lax environmental 
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regulations and we expect a negative coefficient for the unemployment rate (UNemp). Given 
the same income and population level, higher population density intensifies the marginal 
damage of pollution. We also include population density as a determinant for environmental 
regulation stringency and anticipate γpopden>0. Furthermore, we expect γh>0 as suggested by Lan 
and Munro (2013): a region with greater proportion of highly educated population might have 
stricter environmental regulation since more educated people are more likely to be aware of 
environmental quality and its consequences and more efficient in making complaints to force 
regulators to tighten environmental policy. 
 
4. Empirical specification and data choice 
Follow the method applied by He (2006), we apply total differentiation to all five equations and 
divide each of them by their corresponding dependent variable. Then we get the following new 
system as shown below, 
dx x A dA x d x trancost dtrancost x dx
+
x A x A x trancost x trancost x d
dA A E dE A d A Y dY A HCI dHCI A TECH dTECH
A E A E A Y A Y HCI A HCI TECH A TECH
dE E Y dY E d E d
E Y E Y E E
dY Y A dA Y K dK
Y A Y A K Y
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
    
    
    
    
    
  
   
 
 
 
1
1
net
t
net
t
Y L dL Y E dE
K L Y L E Y E
Ed d Y dY Hedu dHedu POPden dPOPden Unemp dUnemp
E Y Y Hedu Hedu POPden POPden Unemp Unemp
      
      


 
 
 
    
    
    
(2) 
        This adjustment transforms each variable in system (1) into its growth rate. We estimate 
the full structural model based on system (2), using the approximation that ln((z+dz)/z)≈dz/z to 
specify each equation with all variables in logarithms form as shown in system (3).  In system (3), 
we identify four endogenous variables in this system: lnAit, lnEit, lnYit and lnit. The eight city-
level exogenous variables are lnHCI, lnTECH, ln, lnK, lnL, lnHedu, lnPOPden and lnUnemp and 
one predetermined variable is lnEt-1net, the firm-level variables are assumed to be exogenous 
since they are not correlated with city level characteristics. The system is over-identified in 
terms of order condition and rank condition.   
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


A g transcost Y x
jit x it x it x it x jit jit
E g Y HCI TECH A
it A it A it A it A it A it it
Y g g E
it E it E it E it it
A K L
it Y it Y it Y it
lnx = a lnA +a ln +a lntrancost +a lnY + u
lnA = a lnE +a ln +a lnY +a lnHCI +a lnTECH + u
lnE = a lnY +a ln +a lnW + u
lnY = a lnA +a lnK +a lnL +a

net
E Y
Y it it
E net Y Hedu density UNemp g
it g it-1 g it g it g it g it it
lnE + u
ln = a lnE +a lnY +a lnHedu +a lnPOPden +a lnUNemp + u
                            (3) 
        The coefficients represent the elasticities of dependent variables with respect to their 
independent variables. The indirect impact of regulation stringency on industrial abatement 
volume can be simply calculated by multiplying the elasticity of industrial abatement volume 
with respect to the economic determinant by the elasticity of this determinant with respect to 
regulation stringency. Hence, the total effect of regulation stringency on industrial abatement 
can be calculated as Eq. (4). 
        
dA
dγ
= αA
γ
⏟
I
+ αA
EαE
γ
⏟  
III
+ αA
Y αY
EαE
γ
⏟  
IV⏟    
V
⏞          
II
                                                              (4) 
where I :direct effect of regulation stringency on industrial abatement volume;  
II: indirect effect of regulation stringency on industrial abatement volume;  
III: abatement chained by regulation induced emission reduction;  
IV: economic growth chained by regulation induced emission;  
V: abatement chained by emission induced economic output change 
According to Eq. (4), the total effect of environmental policy stringency on industrial 
abatement volume decomposes into a direct and an indirect effect. The latter captures the 
effects through two channels, one is the impact of regulation stringency on emission and 
resultant impact of emission on industrial abatement; the other one is the impact of regulation 
stringency on emission and resultant impact of emission-induced economic growth on industrial 
abatement volume. 
Similarly, we calculate the overall effect of regulation stringency on individual abatement 
output of eco-firms. The effect of regulation stringency on an eco-firm’s output can be 
decomposed into a direct (regulation induced business-stealing effect) and an indirect effect 
(regulation induced demand effect). The indirect effect reflects the impact of regulation 
stringency on industrial abatement volume and resultant impact of industrial abatement volume 
on individual abatement output of eco-firms as shown in Eq.(5). 
dx
dγ
= αx
γ
+αx
A
dA
dγ
= αx
γ
⏟
VI
+ αx
A(αA
γ
+ αA
EαE
γ
+ αA
YαY
EαE
γ
⏟              
VII
)
⏟                
VIII
                                  (5) 
where VI : direct effect of regulation stringency on an eco-firm’s output;  
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VII: industrial abatement induced by reinforcement in environmental regulation 
stringency;  
VIII: indirect effect of regulation stringency on an eco-firm’s output. 
The data used in this study is a panel dataset and so we introduce a fixed-effects models to 
control for possible industry and time effects inside each firm and each city. Another benefit of 
applying fixed effects models is that a SEM application with fixed effect allows us to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity while dealing with simultaneity. Since we need to account for both 
firm- and city-level fixed effects, we separately estimate each equation in the SEM (3). Besides 
the time-invariable specific effect, there may exist potential correlation between the residuals of 
different functions due to the inter-correlation between endogenous variables, which means 
cov(i,j)0, where i and j indicate different sub-equations in the system. To get efficient 
estimates, we use two-step GMM-IV estimation to control the covariance matrix of the residuals 
of the system as a whole, where the endogenous variables are instrumented by all the 
exogenous variables. Specifically, we estimate the first equation by using a firm-level fixed effect 
and estimate the following four equations based on city-level fixed effects. In terms of the order 
condition and the rank condition, each equation in the system is over-identified. In addition, we 
also apply the system estimator of 3SLS to estimate the whole simultaneous model where the 
fixed effect of each firm and each city is removed by the first-difference transformation.  
 
4.1 Data and estimation 
To examine the regulatory effects on individual output of eco-firms and industrial abatement in 
China, we select the eco-firms from the Chinese industrial enterprises database (CIED) that 
supplies information on Chinese industrial enterprises above a designated size in China annually 
from 1996 to 2009. CIED are sample surveys, but they are representative, the total production 
quantity of surveyed industrial enterprises accounts for 95% of Chinese industrial production 
quantity. The firm-level data are compiled for 6 eco-industrial sectors for 5 years from 2003 to 
2007, for a sample of 3395 observations. Owning to the use of one-lagged variables, the number 
of observations decreased to 2712. We adopt a traditional definition of eco-industrial sectors, 
including those sectors that provide products and services aiming at clean-up actions and 
remedial measures. At the 4-digit level, there are six eco-industries. They are environment 
protection-related industries of medical materials for environmental pollution treatment (2666); 
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environmental pollution prevention equipment (3691); environmental supervision instruments 
and meters (4121); metal scraps and dross recycling and processing (4310); nonmetal scraps and 
oddment recycling and processing (4320); sewage water processing and recycling (4620). 
The dataset we actually use covers the period from 2003 to 2007. The reason for choosing 
this period is twofold. First, though the surveys of industrial enterprises are conducted annually, 
the surveyed indicators are not consistent and appear to be missing in years immediately 
outside the chosen period. In fact 2003-2007 represents the longest unbroken interval that 
includes all the indicators required for this study. Secondly, the use of the selected period is also 
motivated by the desire to analyze recent trends of environmental regulations promulgated by 
the State Council in 2003. According to the documents for the Administration of the collection 
and use of pollution discharge fees, environmental regulations are tightening annually, which 
provide more variation in levy charges of pollutants.  
Tables 1 summarizes the definitions and summary statistics of all variables, with details of 
sources provided in Appendix 1. Besides CIED, most of the city-level variables are obtained from 
Environment yearbook and Statistical yearbooks of key cities. The data for environmental 
regulation stringency is taken from National Development and Reform Commission for the years 
2003-2007. Owing to the limitation of data, the industrial average wage is computed by using 
firm level wage from CIED for the selected cities. All nominal values are deflated into real value 
by the implicit price deflator of 1990. 
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Table  1 Statistical description of the data 
Variable  Observations Unit Mean S.D. Min Max 
       
Firm-level variables       
X  3390 1000 Yuan 739.08 2152.05 41.870 69017.17 
EXPORT  3390 1000 Yuan 2.867 16.381 0.000 374.93 
RD  3390 1000 Yuan 0.231 1.264 0.000 32.57 
SIZE  3390  135.95 204.508 11.000 2396.0 
ADS  3390 Yuan 462.25 324.300 0.000 806021.0 
FOREIGN  3390 fraction 0.134 0.341 0.000 1.000 
HMT  3390 fraction 0.060 0.246 0.000 1.000 
STATE  3390 fraction 0.065 0.238 0.000 1.000 
COLLECTIVE  3390 fraction 0.055 0.228 0.000 1.000 
PRIVATE  3390 fraction 0.412 0.492 0.000 1.000 
        
City-level variables      
Γ        
SO2  395 Yuan/KG 0.531 0.171 0.200 1.200 
Wastewater  395 Yuan/Ton 0.921 0.353 0.200 1.970 
E        
SO2  395 ton 293.87 213.434 0.140 1313.80 
Wastewater  395 ton 23546.70 13768.87 464.000 91260.0 
A        
SO2  395 ton 133.920 98.84 0.000 630.64 
Wastewater  395 ton 22496.12 17951.95 444.00 88072.0 
transcost  395 million tons 200.26 198.01 3.160 781.08 
CAPstock  395 billion yuan 320.89 343.18 12.150 1660.00 
INDemp  395 thousand 63.22 56.54 2.110 232.82 
HCI  395 1000 Yuan 21.31 7.688 10.706 51.71 
Hedu  395 percent 0.068 0.048 0.008 0.301 
TECH  395 million Yuan 72.34 361.10 0.790 9074.23 
POPdensity  395 per km2 430.77 314.24 120.86 2661.53 
Unemp  395 ‰ 0.056 0.027 0.001 0.180 
 
 
4.2 Data choice for environmental regulation stringency 
According to Kesidou and Demirel (2012), the stringency of environmental regulations is often 
proxied with abatement costs. In the presence of differences in regulatory stringency with 
respect to different kinds of pollutants, we choose charges for SO2 emission and treatment 
charges for industrial waste water as two proxies for local environmental regulation stringency.   
With one-third of China’s territory widely reported to be affected by acid rain, reducing SO2 
emissions has been the key environmental target in China. By amending the 1987 Atmospheric 
Pollution Prevention and Control Act in August 1995, which newly added SO2 emission from coal 
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combustion as the regulated pollutant, China has since 1996 started levying the charges for SO2 
emissions in the so-called Two Control Zones based on the total quantity of emissions and at the 
rate of Yuan 0.20 per kilo of pollution equivalent (Yu, 2006). Since July 2003, this charge was 
applied nationwide and the charge rate was raised step by step. From 1 July 2005 onwards, the 
charge was applied at the level of Yuan 0.60 per kilo of pollution equivalent 1. To help meet the 
energy-saving and environmental control goals set for the 11th five-year economic plan, the 
Chinese government planned to double the charges for SO2 emissions in three steps from the 
existing level to Yuan 1.2 per kilo of pollutant equivalent within three years (The State Council, 
2007). A key point is that local governments were allowed to raise pollution charges above the 
national levels, and thus levies over the sample period vary with the weight placed upon 
environmental protection by local authorities (Dasugpta, et al., 2001). Therefore, we use the 
actual local levy rate with respect to SO2 emissions to measure the actual local regulatory 
stringency faced by an industrial polluter.  
To measure China’s regulatory stringency of industrial waste water, we use an effective charge 
for industrial waste water treatment. As Smarzynska and Wei (2001) emphasize, many studies 
have had to rely on very broad proxies for environmental stringency, potentially causing 
measurement error. The availability of local treatment charges for industrial wastewater allows 
us to specify the stringency of regulations using a price-based policy instrument at the level of 
administration. We thereby avoid the use of the national level of levy rate for industrial 
wastewater (0.7 Yuan per kilo of pollutant equivalent) since it cannot measure the differences in 
regulatory stringencies due to the differences in local enforcement capacity. Following Wang 
(2002), we choose treatment charges for industrial wastewater as a proxy for environmental 
regulation stringency based on the following considerations. First, it reflects actual charges to 
firm’s per unit of polluted wastewater and, thus, may reasonably measure the actual pollution 
                                                          
1 Since 1999, Beijing charges 1.2 Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent for SO2 emissions; Hangzhou and 
Jilin raised charges from 0.2 Yuan to 0.6 Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent from 1 July 2003; Zhengzhou 
charged 0.5 Yuan per kilo pollution equivalent for SO2 emission from 1 July 2003 to July 2004 and the rate 
was raised to 0.6 Yuan per kilo pollution equivalent from 1 July 2005 (SEPA et al., 2003). Jiangsu province 
raised charges for SO2 emissions from Yuan 0.6 to Yuan 1.2 per kilo of pollution equivalent from 1 July 
2007 onwards, three years ahead of the National schedule (Zhang, 2011). 
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cost faced by an industrial polluter in a certain city 2. Besides, it is set and collected by the local 
environmental protection bureaus and offices and the majority of charge revenue is used to 
invest in pollution prevention measures. So the treatment charge per unit of industrial 
wastewater in a Chinese city represents a policy-flavored intervention on the behalf of 
government. Furthermore, it varies across cities and over time. Part of the variation is due to 
differences in pollutant concentration standards, which are determined jointly by the national 
and the local governments. Part of the variation is also due to significant differences in 
enforcement capacity at the local level. However, we cannot rule out that the possibility that 
the variation in treatment charge of industrial wastewater is due to variations in efficiency 
rather than stringency. Against, this and considering the national widespread adoption of 
existing mature wastewater treatment technologies, we note that the difference in wastewater 
treatment efficiency may not be very large across cities. 
It is worth re-emphasizing that the output of our eco-industries does not just cover waste-water 
treatment and SO2, but a wide variety of other environmental cleaning services. So that while 
the charge for wastewater and SO2 is a direct measure of stringency for some activities, in our 
model we are treating these two variables as proxies for the overall stringency of environmental 
regulation. 
 
5. Results 
Table 3 displays the results obtained using a two-step GMM estimator for panel data models 
with fixed-effects to estimate each equation in SEM (3). We can see that the overall fit of system 
is good. The fixed effects specification is found to be strongly favored by a Hausman test in all 
models. In most cases, the instrumental variables strongly correlate with the instrumented 
endogenous variables and the model passes the under-identification tests. The Kleibergen-Paap 
                                                          
2 The average charge for urban sewage treatment was reported to be Yuan 0.7 per ton for 36 
large and medium cities in China by the end of 2008, whereas the corresponding treatment cost 
is Yuan 1.1 per ton (NDRC, 2009; CAEP, 2009). In most of cities, the charge standard of 
wastewater treatment is set lower than its cost which indirectly reflects the difference in 
enforcement capacity of environmental regulation at the local level. 
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rk LM statistics of under-identification tests suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis of 
under-identification, which means that the estimated equations are identified in that the 
instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors. In most scenarios, the Cragg-
Donald Wald F statistics compare favorably to the statistics reported in Stock and Yogo (2005), 
which suggest that we can comfortably reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. The 
Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term and that the specifications are correct.  
 
The abatement output equation as shown in column (1) in Table 2 explains the determinants 
that influence the individual output of eco-firms. The coefficients on abatement demand (lnA) 
are in the expected direction for SO2 and wastewater, implying the positive demand effect. As 
for regulatory stringency (lnγ), in both cases, it is positively associated with individual abatement 
output, but the effect of SO2 regulation stringency is insignificant; we will discuss their 
magnitudes in the next subsection. The positive sign of lnγ implies that the induced output-
restriction effect does not apply here. This possibly reflects that the original data for output is in 
nominal form (i.e. it is revenue rather than output) and we deflate it. To the extent that firms 
raise price following stricter regulation this can lead to an increase in net revenue.  As for the 
influence of other control variables, the coefficients are also measured with good precision and 
demonstrate strong and plausible effects. Turning to our firm-level variables, model (1) and 
model (6) in Table 2 show that the abatement supply of an eco-firm is a positive and significant 
function of EXPORT suggesting that exports-oriented firms tend to have more abatement supply, 
other things being equal. Not surprisingly, abatement output is a positive function of research 
and development expenditure, RD, suggesting that innovation within firms contribute to a firm’s 
abatement supply. As for the ownership composition3, paid-in capital contributed by state-
owned investors (STATE) is shown to have significantly negative impact on abatement supply by 
                                                          
3 The State Statistical Bureau of China (SSB) assigns to each firm in the database a categorical variable 
indicating ownership status. Nevertheless, it is also possible to construct a continuous measure of 
ownership composition from the database by looking at the fraction of paid-in capital contributed by the 
state and private and foreign investors. This feature is useful when it comes to distinguishing between 
SOEs that are liquidated and those that are transferred to non-state hands. 
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eco-firms. We cannot find significant coefficients for other ownership variables. Besides, the 
coefficient for transportation cost (transcost) is not statistically significant.  
Model (2) and model (7) in Table 2 provides our estimates of industrial abatement volume with 
respect to industrial SO2 and industrial wastewater. Local economic growth (lnY) is found to be 
significantly positive related to abatement volume of industrial wastewater emissions but it is 
estimated to be significantly negative associated with abatement volume of industrial SO2 
emissions. The positive coefficients for Eit confirm that the abatement decision of industrial 
polluters is increasing in the scale of emissions. Regulatory stringency (Lnγ) is found to be 
positive, significant determinant of abatement demand. The variable lnTECH is estimated to be a 
positive but insignificant determinant of abatement volume of both pollutants. Finally, the 
variable lnHCI is estimated to be a positive, significant determinant of industrial SO2 abatement, 
but an insignificant determinant of industrial wastewater, reflecting that human capital’s impact 
on pollution abatement differs with respect to different pollutants. Human capital level has a 
significant effect on installment and absorption of advanced desulfurization technology, whilst 
its impact is insignificant on wastewater treatment technologies which have been widely applied 
in industrial production. 
Equations (3) and (8) of Table 2 give the estimation results for industrial SO2 emissions and 
wastewater emission respectively. We get positive and significant coefficients for the scale 
effect and composition effect for both pollutants. The significantly negative coefficients of 
regulatory stringency variable (lnγ) for both industrial SO2 emissions and industrial wastewater 
emissions reveal the fact that the levy charges of industrial SO2 and treatment charges of 
industrial wastewater does have deterrent effect on industrial emissions.   
Equations labelled (4) and (9) display results obtained using output as the dependent variable. 
Not surprisingly capital stock (lnCAPstock) and labor (lnINDemp) are positively linked to output.  
Interestingly, abatement demand (lnA) for industrial wastewater is positively and significantly 
linked to output; while the abatement demand of SO2 emissions is negatively related to output. 
An intuitive explanation is that Chinese industrial polluters might take different attitudes 
towards the pollution abatement of wastewater and SO2 in response to a stricter environmental 
regulation. In fact, this result may be attributed to the widespread adoption of industrial 
wastewater abatement technology and an increasing number of urban sewage treatment 
centers in most Chinese cities. It is relatively easier to master the wastewater abatement 
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technology and rearrange the combination of production inputs, hence industrial GDP growth 
can be obtained from a careful redesign of the production process induced by the need to 
comply with environmental regulations. The SO2 abatement technology, unlike the wastewater 
treatment technology, is not widely used. Particularly the industrial application of 
desulfurization technology is still at the experimental stage. When a firm allocates resources to 
abatement activities, this is conventionally believed to reduce productivity measured by 
ordinary outputs (Telle and Larsson, 2007). An increase in SO2 abatement expenditures would 
raise production cost and result in a negative impact on the value of total output. Finally, total 
emissions of both pollutants generated in industrial production (lnE) are found to be the 
significant determinants of total output. 
In contrast to He’s (2006) finding that the policy decision on the pollution control of industrial 
SO2 emissions is not based on the historical factors, both lagged industrial SO2 emission and 
industrial wastewater emissions (lnEt-1) are found to possess a positive, statistically significant, 
relationship with strictness of environmental regulation in both (5) and (10). The difference may 
possibly be attributed to our use of different measurements for environmental stringency. 
Output (lnY) is found to be positively related to strictness of environmental regulations on both 
SO2 and wastewater, which is consistent with previous findings in Wang and Wheeler (1996) and 
He (2006), supporting the view that economic prosperity facilitates an increase of public 
demand for a better environment which will result in the intensification of environmental 
regulation stringency. As expected, we find a positive correlation between human capital level 
of city (Hedu, another human capital measure based on education) and stringency of 
environmental regulation, at least in terms of regulatory stringency of controlling industrial SO2 
emissions. Finally, unemployment rate (UNEMP) is estimated to be a negative, significant 
determinant of regulatory stringency for both pollutants, whilst population density (POPdensity) 
is found to be an insignificant determinant of both SO2 regulation stringency and industrial 
wastewater regulation stringency. The significantly negative correlation between regulation 
stringency and the unemployment rate is in line with Gray and Deily’s (1996) and Cole et al.’s 
(2008) findings that a high level of unemployment limits the scope for active environmental 
policies. 
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Table  2 The simultaneous system estimation results (2-Step GMM estimation for simultaneous system, fixed effect, main 
Chinese industrial cities during the period 2003-2007) 
Variables 
SO2  wastewater 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
lnx  lnA  lnE  lnY  lnγ  lnx  lnA  lnE  lnY  lnγ 
lnA 
0.223*** 
(0.056) 
    -0.017* 
(0.011) 
   0.539*** 
(0.031) 
    0.332* 
(0.189) 
  
lnY 
  -0.235* 
(0.127) 
 0.066*** 
(0.018) 
  0.209*** 
(0.038) 
  0.360*** 
(0.115) 
0.274*** 
(0.076) 
  0.393* 
(0.223) 
lnΩ 
     0.094** 
(0.045) 
        
 
 0.136* 
(0.077) 
     
lnγ 
0.054 
(0.086) 
 0.238*** 
(0.074) 
-0.168*** 
(0.055) 
 
 
    0.176** 
(0.085 
 0.456*** 
(0.135) 
-0.392*** 
(0.130) 
   
lnE 
  0.746*** 
(0.278) 
 
 
  0.048*** 
(0.023) 
    0.886*** 
(0.221) 
  0.134** 
(0.067) 
  
lagged lnEnet 
        0.155** 
(0.067) 
         0.031** 
(0.014) 
lnEXPORT 
0.092*** 
(0.027) 
        0.115*** 
(0.026) 
       
lnRD 
0.250** 
(0.120) 
         0.237 
(0.630) 
        
lnSIZE 
0.213*** 
(0.292) 
        0.109*** 
(0.021) 
       
lnADS 
0.308** 
(1.536) 
         0.357* 
(0.187) 
        
lnFOREIGN 
-0.032 
(0.074) 
         -0.102 
(0.083) 
        
lnHMT 
0.089 
(0.062) 
         0.102 
(0.085) 
        
lnSTATE 
-0.157** 
(0.072) 
         -0.148** 
(0.070) 
        
lnCOLLECTIVE 
-0.077 
(0.052) 
         -0.107 
(0.068) 
        
lnPRIVATE 
0.042 
(0.037) 
         0.025 
(0.038) 
        
lntranscost 
0.135 
(0.887) 
         -0.119 
(0.087) 
        
lnCAPstock 
      0.292*** 
(0.319) 
         0.751*** 
(0.238) 
 
lnINDemp 
      0.052** 
(0.019) 
         0.098 
(0.179) 
  
lnTECH 
  0.016 
(0.011) 
          0.054 
(0.043) 
      
lnHCI 
  0.004** 
(0.002) 
          0.016 
(0.012) 
       
lnHedu 
        0.016** 
(0.008) 
         0.023 
(0.027) 
lnPOPdensity 
        0.025 
(0.029) 
         0.034 
(0.014) 
lnUnemp 
        -0.189** 
(0.108) 
         -0.373* 
(0.202) 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Variables 
SO2  wastewater 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Lnx  lnA  lnE  lnY  lnγ  lnx  lnA  lnE  lnY  Lnγ 
                    
                    
Hausman  
(fixed effect) 
206.54 
(0.000) 
 54.27 
(0.014) 
 71.28 
(0.000) 
 62.01 
(0.008) 
 42.12 
(0.023) 
 245.74 
(0.000) 
 73.22 
(0.000) 
 86.73 
(0.000) 
 76.98 
(0.000) 
 61.24 
(0.004) 
Kleibergen-Paap 
rk LM statistic 
(Underidentifica
tion test ) 
10.051 
{0.092} 
 
7.646 
{0.083} 
 
43.573 
{0.000} 
 
7.014 
{0.092} 
 
172.268 
{0.000} 
 
15.859 
{0.044} 
 
13.256 
{0.033} 
 
10.778 
{0.088} 
 
6.127 
{0.127} 
 
12.663 
{0.013} 
Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic 
(Weak 
identification 
test) 
30.708  45.34  6.205  16.886  101.307  19.540  11.540  7.336  12.208  106.526 
Sargan statistics 
(system 
identification) 
5.814 
{0.325} 
 
2.214 
{0.696} 
 
2.325 
{0.887} 
 
2.750 
{0.431} 
 
1.223 
{0.747} 
 
5.928 
{0.313} 
 
5.216 
{0.266} 
 
8.310 
{0.140} 
 
4.151 
{0.245} 
 
1.245 
{0.742} 
Observation 2317  308  308  308  308  2317  308  308  308  308 
a. ***, ** and * denote significance at 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively 
b. Equations (1) and (6) use firm fixed effects, and the reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
adjusted for clusters by cities. Other models use city fixed effect, and the reported standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. 
c. The heteroskedasticity is corrected by the White’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
d. The J-statistics is obtained from Sargan test of the validity of all instruments. 
e. Reduction in the number of observations is due to the data transformation, such as lagged variable and logarithms 
form. 
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5.2 Policy simulation: The Effect of regulatory stringency 
In Tables 3 and 4 we calculate the direct, indirect and total impact of environmental regulation 
stringency on industrial abatement demand and an eco-firm’s output by using the estimated 
coefficients as shown in Table 2. The effects and corresponding standard errors are computed 
using the delta method. From Table 3 below, we can see that the regulation stringency of both 
pollutants has a significant positive direct effect and a significant negative indirect effect on 
industrial abatement demand. Though the indirect effects are negative, the overall impacts of 
environmental regulation stringency on industrial abatement demand are estimated to be 
positive. Our results show that a 1% increase in the levy charge of industrial SO2 emission 
increases industrial SO2 abatement volume by 0.114%; a 1% increase in the treatment charge of 
industrial wastewater will lead to an increase in industrial abatement volume by 0.091%.  
 
Table  3 The impact of environmental regulation stringency on industrial abatement demand 
Regulation stringency of  
target pollutant  
 Direct effect  Indirect effect  Total effect 
 αA
γ   αA
E αE
γ+αA
Y αY
EαE
γ  αA
γ +αA
E αE
γ+αA
Y αY
EαE
γ 
SO2  
 0.238*** 
(0.074) 
  -0.124** 
(0.059) 
 0.114** 
(0.058) 
Wastewater   0.456*** 
(0.108) 
 -0.365** 
(0.166) 
 0.091 ** 
(0.043) 
a. The effects and corresponding standard errors are computed by using delta method. 
b. ***, ** and * denote significance at 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively. 
 
Turning to the effect of regulation stringency on individual supply as shown in Table 4, the direct 
effect of SO2 regulation stringency on an eco-firm’s abatement supply is insignificant. This result 
implies that for SO2 a regulation-induced output restriction effect does not exist for our sample 
as a whole. Hence the overall effect is due to the indirect effect, implying that a 1% increase in 
the levy charge of industrial SO2 emission will lead to an increase in an eco-firm’s output by 
0.089%. As for the regulation stringency of industrial wastewater, both the direct effect and 
demand effect are found to be significantly positive. A 1% increase in the treatment charge of 
industrial wastewater emission will result in a 0.225% increase in an eco-firm’s abatement 
supply. 
It is notable that the effect of regulation stringency on wastewater abatement output is 
estimated to be greater than that of SO2 regulation stringency on individual abatement output. 
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In the abatement market, the majority of ready-made provided is wastewater related 
abatement goods and services, which may induce eco-firms to be more sensitive to 
environmental policy of wastewater emissions. 
Table 4. The impact of environmental regulation stringency on individual abatement supply 
Regulation stringency 
of  target pollutant 
Direct effect 
(Output restriction 
effect) 
 Indirect effect 
(Demand effect) 
 
Total effect 
 αx
γ
  αx
A(αA
E αE
γ
+αA
Y αY
EαE
γ)  αx
γ
+𝛼x
A(αA
E αE
γ
+αA
Y αY
EαE
γ) 
SO2  
  0.054 
(0.086) 
 0.025* 
(0.014) 
 0.079 
(0.097) 
Wastewater 
emissions 
 0.176*** 
(0.057) 
 0.049** 
(0.023) 
 0.225** 
(0.113) 
a. The effects and corresponding standard errors are computed by using the delta method. 
b. ***, ** and * denote significance at 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively. 
 
Generally speaking, a stricter environmental policy not only contributes to better industrial 
environmental performance but also increases the average individual abatement output of the 
whole eco-industry. In our dataset, the eco-industry includes 6 sectors. Since the function of 
abatement products varies tremendously across different eco-industrial sectors, the output 
decisions of eco-firms in each sector may be quite different in response to environmental 
regulation stringency. Hence, to clarify the relationship between environmental regulation and 
individual abatement output with respect to individual sectors, we divide the sample into 5 
subsets according to their classified sectors.4 The results are shown in Table 5 and Table 6. 
From the city-level regression results, we know that the overall regulation effects on 
abatement demand of industrial SO2 emission and industrial wastewater emission are 0.114 and 
0.091 respectively. To see the magnitude of the regulation effect on the abatement output of 
different eco-industrial sectors, we calculate the direct effect and indirect effect (demand effect) 
and the total effect by using the coefficients obtained from Tables 5 and 6. As shown in Table 7, 
in most scenarios, the direct effects are small; a stringent environmental policy can stimulate 
more individual abatement output. Being quite different from other sectors, a stringent 
environmental policy for controlling industrial wastewater decreases individual abatement 
output of sewage water processing and recycling sector (4620). From Table 7, we see that a 1% 
                                                          
4 Because of their small size and similarity, we merge 4310 and 4320 (metal scraps and dross recycling and 
processing (4310); nonmetal scraps and oddment recycling and processing (4320)). 
 25 / 34 
 
increase in treatment charges of industrial wastewater decreases the output of a sewage 
treatment factory by 0.117% in total. 
This negative direct effect in the water treatment sector (4620) may reflect the presence of 
a business-stealing effect. It’s relatively easier to operate a sewage treatment factory with 
technical backup, due to the availability of ready-made wastewater treatment technologies in 
abatement market. This lowers the threshold for market entry of operating sewage treatment 
business and attracts more entrants.  Besides, China has stipulated policies to encourage private 
and foreign investment in wastewater treatment facilities. Jiang, and Zheng, 2010 for instance 
note high levels of entry in the adjacent water supply industry (4610) over our sample period.  
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Table 5 Estimates for individual abatement output of eco-firms of different sectors based on SO2 regulation stringency (2-step 
GMM, fixed effect, main Chinese industrial cities during the period 2003-2007) 
Variables 
Sectors of eco-firms 
2666  3691  4121  4310/4320  4620 
lnA (industrial SO2 abatement) 0.708
*** (0.337)  0.255** (0.119)  0.218** (0.102)  0.195*** (0.769)  0.355*** (0.116) 
lnγ (SO2 regulation) 0.049 (0.126)  0.073 (0.081)  0.051
* (0.027)  -0.067 (0.182)  -0.025 (0.058) 
lnEXPORT 0.149* (0.087)  0.115** (0.054)  0.291 (0.262)  0.177 (0.126)  0.240 (0.213) 
lnRD 0.796 (3.974)  0.189* (0.106)  -0.264 (0.584)  0.527** (0.229)  0.218 (0.286) 
lnSIZE 0.039 (0.071)  0.366*** (0.064)  0.512** (0.233)  0.138 (0.089)  0.235 (0.174) 
lnADS 0.185 (0.197)  0.251*** (0.057)  0.707 (0.614)  -0.845 (1.176)  -0.742 (0.713) 
lnFOREIGN -0.112 (0.739)  0.098 (0.138)  0.008 (0.028)  -0.110 (0.149)  0.551** (0.263) 
lnHMT -0.248* (0.139)  0.238 (0.175)  0.084 (0.169)  -0.103 (0.153)  0.224 (0.183) 
lnSTATE -0.108 (0.292)  -0.418** (0.202)  0.408*** (0.094)  -0.081 (0.431)  -0.078 (0.137) 
lnCOLLECTIVE 0.188** (0.086)  -0.059 (0.085)  0.058*** (0.093)  0.080 (0.139)  -0.033 (0.122) 
lnPRIVATE 0.027 (0.107)  0.075 (0.056)  0.094 (0.182)  -0.123 (0.097)  0.068 (0.069) 
Lntranscost 0.469 (0.376)  0.124 (0.159)  0.401 (0.316)  0.132 (0.141)  0.214* (0.120) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic  
(Underidentification test ) 
16.563 
 
{0.029}  14.032 {0.063}  9.958 {0.268}  9.902 {0.272}  13.702 {0.086} 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  
(Weak identification test) 
32.055   22.035   5.640   11.030   21.993  
Sargan statistics  
(system identification) 
10.083 {0.184}  15.592 {0.029}  6.892 {0.440}  7.675 {0.362}  6.770 {0.453} 
Observation 280  1264  144  746  202 
a. ***, ** and * denote significance at 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively. 
b. The results are based on firm-level analysis in which the endogenous variables lnA and lnγ are instrumented by all system 
exogenous variables. 
c. The variable A in this case is industrial SO2 abatement volume and the variable γ is environmental regulation stringency of 
industrial SO2 emissions. 
d. The reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clusters by cities.  
e. The J-statistics is obtained from Sargan test of the validity of all instruments. 
f. Reduction in the number of observations is due to the data transformation, such as lagged variable and logarithms form. 
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Table 6 Estimates for individual abatement output of eco-firms of different sectors based on industrial wastewater regulation 
stringency (2-step GMM, fixed effect, main Chinese industrial cities during the period 2003-2007) 
Variables 
Sectors of eco-firms 
2666  3691  4121  4310/4320  4620 
lnA (wastewater abatement) 0.859
** (0.437)  0.822*** (0.183)  0.608** (0.298)  0.208 (0.142)  0.326** (0.134) 
lnγ (wastewater regulation) 0.127*** (0.033)  0.279** (0.137)  0.089* (0.046)  0.082 (0.091)  -0.146** (0.073) 
lnEXPORT -0.154** (0.078)  0.120** (0.048)  -0.418 (0.337)  0.306*** (0.117)  0.203 (0.236) 
lnRD 0.114 (0.182)  0.150 (0.102)  -0.360 (0.479)  0.634*** (0.235)  0.231 (0.286) 
lnSIZE 0.002** (0.001)  0.329*** (0.067)  0.586*** (0.192)  0.099 (0.163)  0.272 (0.166) 
lnADS 0.504** (0.232)  0.267*** (0.052)  0.641 (0.927)  -0.157 (0.169)  -0.734 (0.787) 
lnFOREIGN -0.372 (0.277)  0.163 (0.117)  0.404 (0.333)  -0.082 (0.148)  0.587** (0.231) 
lnHMT -0.308*** (0.112)  0.317 (0.131)  0.084 (0.169)  -0.103 (0.153)  0.184 (0.242) 
lnSTATE -0.324 (0.359)  -0.375 (0.319)  0.293*** (0.106)  0.192 (0.237)  -0.082 (0.127) 
lnCOLLECTIVE 0.188** (0.086)  -0.096 (0.129)  0.129*** (0.179)  0.112 (0.142)  -0.119 (0.113) 
lnPRIVATE -0.054 (0.081)  0.044 (0.058)  0.061 (0.182)  -0.072 (0.095)  0.069 (0.088) 
Lntranscost 0.533 (0.342)  0.034 (0.155)  0.401 (0.316)  0.143 (0.173)  0.058 (0.183) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic  
(Underidentification test ) 
16.308 
 
{0.037}  15.181 {0.056}  10.785 {0.214}  15.865 {0.044}  15.914 {0.042} 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  
(Weak identification test) 
32.338   17.034   4.411   30.233   34.101  
Sargan statistics  
(system identification) 
5.503 {0.599}  14.002 {0.051}  9.228 {0.237}  10.261 {0.174}  4.294 {0.745} 
Observation 280  1264  144  748  204 
a. ***, ** and * denote significance at 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.  
b. The results are based on firm-level analysis in which the endogenous variables lnA and lnγ are instrumented by all system 
exogenous variables. 
c. The variable A in this case is industrial wastewater abatement volume and the variable γ is environmental regulation stringency 
of industrial wastewater emissions. 
d. The reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clusters by cities.  
e. The J-statistics is obtained from Sargan test of the validity of all instruments. 
a. Reduction in the number of observations is due to the data transformation, such as lagged variable and logarithms form. 
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Table 7 Regulation’s effect on the abatement output of different eco-industrial sectors 
Eco-
industrial 
Sectors 
 
αx
A 
 
αA
E αE
γ+αA
Y αY
EαE
γ 
 Regulation effect on individual abatement output 
   Output 
restriction 
effect 
 Demand 
effect 
 Total  
effect 
   αx
𝛾
  αx
A(αA
E αE
γ+αA
Y αY
EαE
γ)  αx
γ+𝛼x
A(αA
E αE
γ+αA
Y αY
EαE
γ) 
 Regulation stringency of industrial SO2 
2666  0.708*** (0.337)  0.114** (0.058)  0.049 (0.126)  0.081** (0.039)  0.130 (0.098) 
3691  0.255** (0.119)  0.114** (0.058)  0.073 (0.081)  0.029* (0.016)  0.102 (0.086) 
4121  0.218** (0.102)  0.114** (0.058)  0.051* (0.027)  0.024* (0.013)  0.075 (0.051) 
4310/4320  0.195*** (0.769)  0.114** (0.058)  -0.067 (0.182)  0.022** (0.011)  -0.045 (0.037) 
4620  0.396** (0.194)  0.114** (0.058)  -0.025 (0.058)  0.057* (0.031)  0.032 (0.023) 
 Regulation stringency of industrial wastewater 
2666  0.859** (0.436)  0.091** (0.043)  0.127*** (0.033)  0.078** (0.038)  0.205** (0.101) 
3691  0.822*** (0.183)  0.091** (0.043)  0.279** (0.137)  0.074** (0.035)  0.353* (0.177) 
4121  0.608** (0.298)  0.091** (0.043)  0.089** (0.043)  0.055* (0.028)  0.144* (0.076) 
4310/4320  0.208 (0.142)  0.091** (0.043)  0.082 (0.091)  0.018 (0.020)  0.100 (0.142) 
4620  0.326** (0.134)  0.091** (0.043)  -0.146** (0.073)  0.029** (0.018)  -0.117** (0.091) 
a. The effects and corresponding standard errors are computed by using delta method. 
b. ***, ** and * denote significance at 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively. 
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6 Concluding remarks and policy implications 
Taking into account the fact that regulatory stringency may differ according to its target pollutants, 
this study investigates the changes of industrial abatement volume as well as individual output of 
eco-firms in response to the stringency of environmental regulation. On the basis of a panel 
dataset of 678 eco-firms in 78 Chinese industrial cities during the period 2003-2007, we estimate a 
5 equation model to clarify the relationship between regulatory stringency and the output of eco-
industry firms. 
The results have shown that a more stringent environmental regulation of both industrial SO2 
and wastewater emissions, not only contribute to the improvement of industrial environmental 
performance but also extend a helping hand to the development of eco-firms. With respect to the 
regulatory impact on industrial abatement demand, although the indirect effect of regulation 
stringency on industrial abatement volume is negative, the overall effect is positive for both 
pollutants. Turning to the regulatory impact on individual abatement supply, we find that the 
effect of tighter SO2 regulation on individual abatement output is found to be insignificant; instead, 
SO2 regulation stringency can indirectly affect an eco-firm’s output through its impact on industrial 
abatement demand. As for the environmental regulation stringency of industrial wastewater, we 
find that the treatment charges of industrial wastewater can directly and indirectly affect an eco-
firm’s output decision. In this regard, the sewage treatment stands out: the overall effect of  
tighter industrial wastewater regulation on the individual abatement output of existing firms in 
the sewage treatment sector is found to be negative, suggesting the existence of a “business-
stealing effect” in the sewage treatment sector that surpasses the demand effect. 
We finish on a note of caution. We see this paper as a first attempt to examine the complex 
linkage between regulatory stringency and demand for and supply of abatement for a large 
developing country such as China. In addition, we do not know whether the relationships 
estimated in this paper apply to pollutants other than SO2 and wastewater. These are currently the 
only two pollutants for which the data of industrial abatement volume are available in China. 
Inevitably, the study would be benefited from a richer dataset with more pollutants in a longer 
period. In time, such data may be forthcoming and so allowing more sophisticated analysis. 
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Appendix 1. Data Sources. 
Variable Definitions Source 
Firm level variables 
X Annual output value of the eco-firm (NT 10,000Yuan) 
China industrial enterprises 
database  (CIED) 
EXPORT Annual export delivery value of eco-firm CIED 
RD Annual R&D expenditure of the eco-firm (NT 10,000 yuan) CIED 
SIZE Annual number of staff and workers CIED 
ADS Annual advertising expenditure of the eco-firm (10,000Yuan) CIED 
FOREIGN fraction of paid-in capital contributed by foreign investors CIED 
HMT Fraction of paid-in capital contributed by Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan investors CIED 
STATE Fraction of paid-in capital contributed by the state-owned investors CIED 
COLLECTIVE Fraction of paid-in capital contributed by the collective-owned investors CIED 
PRIVATE Fraction of paid-in capital contributed by private investors CIED 
   
City level variables 
Γ 
Stringency of environmental regulations 
measured by annual average treatment charges 
for industrial wastewater and annual levy for 
industrial SO2 emissions 
National Development and 
Reform Commission 
A Industrial wastewater treatment volume and industrial SO2 abatement volume.5 
Statistical yearbooks of key cities 
(2004-2008) (“city yearbook”) and 
Environment yearbook of key 
cities (2003-2008) 
(“Environmental yearbook”) 
E 
Annual total industrial emissions in terms of 
industrial wastewater emissions and industrial 
SO2 emission (NT 10,000tons for wastewater, NT 
ton for SO2) 
City Yearbook, Environment 
yearbook  
Enet 
The value of E-A, annual emission emitted after 
abatement in terms of industrial SO2 and 
industrial wastewater 
City Yearbook, Environment 
yearbook 
transcost Annual total volume of freight (10,000 tons) City Yearbook 
CAPstock Annual Industrial fixed asset stock 10
9 Yuan, 
adjusted by1990 price of key cities City Yearbook 
INDemp Workers employed in industrial sector City Yearbook 
HCI industrial average wage paid to staff (human capital intensity) City Yearbook 
Hedu Ratio of college educated and above population City Yearbook 
TECH Annual scientific and technological expenditure by local government and enterprises. City Yearbook 
POPdensity Population density per km2 City Yearbook 
Unemp Annual unemployment rate ‰ City Yearbook 
 
                                                          
5 The industrial abatement includes both end-of-pipe abatement and cleaner production abatement.  
